



## 28 1. INTRODUCTION


29 Oil refineries are in the core of the fossil fuel production chain, playing a vital  
30 socioeconomic role since they affect a spectrum of parameters related to the economy  
31 and the communities in their proximity. Hence, safeguarding the integrity of these  
32 critical infrastructures in the aftermath of natural hazard-related events is of paramount  
33 importance in compliance with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction  
34 2015-2030 (United Nations, 2015). To accomplish this goal, there is an emerging need  
35 for the development of a state-of-the-art holistic framework not only for evaluating the  
36 structural integrity and vulnerability of the individual critical assets against several  
37 natural and man-made perils, but also for enabling an efficient, practical, and robust  
38 risk-aware assessment of the refinery plant as an integrated system. Despite the  
39 advancements in the seismic design and construction practices, the seismic hazard  
40 remains a critical concern for oil refinery structures, since catastrophic failures are still  
41 occurring. Such natural-technological (NaTech) accidents in refineries (e.g. Godoy  
42 2007; Hatayama 2008; Girgin 2011; Bi *et al.* 2021; Krausmann and Cruz 2021) often  
43 involve various types of critical asset structural failures that could eventually lead to  
44 the disruption of the facility's operations or even to more devastating consequences,  
45 such as injuries and fatalities, environmental pollution, and severe economic losses  
46 extending well beyond the loss of revenue.

47 A variety of structural typologies are typically encountered in an oil refinery,  
48 including liquid storage tanks, pressure vessels, piping, pipe-racks, process towers,  
49 open-frame buildings supporting industrial equipment, chimneys, process towers,  
50 auxiliary buildings, and flares. These structures possess fundamentally dissimilar  
51 geometrical and dynamic characteristics, thus the needed level of detail in their  
52 analytical representation within a seismic performance assessment framework is likely

53 to vary considerably. Among the structural typologies encountered, the basis to evaluate  
54 the seismic performance via rigorous or reduced-order numerical models exists for only  
55 a limited number of them. In particular, past analytical seismic fragility assessment  
56 studies have been focused on liquid storage tanks (e.g. Bakalis *et al.* 2017; Spritzer and  
57 Guzey 2017; Vathi *et al.* 2017; Phan *et al.* 2020; Bakalis and Karamanos 2021; Yu and  
58 Whittaker 2021), pipe-racks (e.g. Bursi *et al.* 2018; Di Sarno and Karagiannakis 2021;  
59 Farhan and Bousias 2020; Zhang *et al.* 2021), and pressure vessels (e.g. Patkas and  
60 Karamanos 2007; Karakostas *et al.* 2015). On the other hand, the seismic fragility of  
61 typical high-rise stacks, i.e. process towers, chimneys, and flare stacks, has not received  
62 the same level of attention from the research community. A handful of studies is  
63 available on the seismic fragility of reinforced concrete (RC) chimneys via numerical  
64 models (e.g. Huang *et al.* 2004; Gould and Huang 2006; Zhou *et al.* 2015, 2019; Guo  
65 *et al.* 2018, 2019; Qiu *et al.* 2020), while contributions on steel chimneys and process  
66 towers are very scarce (e.g. Lopez *et al.* 1996; Moharrami and Amini 2014). Research  
67 on flare stacks to date is mainly focused on the wind hazard (e.g. Sheng *et al.* 2016; Liu  
68 2017). This comes as no surprise since earthquakes are not the primary cause of  
69 catastrophic failures when it comes to high-rise stacks compared to wind loading (Wang  
70 and Fan 2019). Nevertheless, refineries are classified as critical facilities and hence  
71 their undisrupted operation against a spectrum of perils, including earthquakes, should  
72 be ensured to comply with the strict national and international safety regulations.

73 Owing to the above, a set of typical high-rise stacks encountered in an oil refinery is  
74 examined, attempting to fill the pertinent gap in the literature. In particular, the  
75 structural typologies examined herein comprise (a) a 30m high process tower, (b) a 30m  
76 high steel chimney, (c) an 80m high steel chimney, (d) an 87m high reinforced concrete  
77 chimney, and (e) a 67m high flare structure. Schematic illustrations of these structures

78 are presented in Fig. 1(a-d). Since non-seismic loads (such as wind, or internal  
79 pressures) govern design, these structures are not necessarily specific to any region and  
80 may be considered as staples of many refineries, at least for sites where hurricane-  
81 strength winds are not a major hazard. Where possible, reduced-order models were  
82 developed for the aforementioned structures to reliably capture the most characteristic  
83 failure modes with less computational effort. In other cases, more refined models were  
84 required to achieve a satisfactory level of accuracy. For each one of those assets,  
85 suitable Damage States (DS) were defined, representative of characteristic failure  
86 modes that are likely to be encountered at increasing levels of the seismic intensity  
87 measure (*IM*), along with the associated Limit States (LS) capacity thresholds that  
88 signal exceedance. The induced seismic demands were computed by means of  
89 Incremental Dynamic Analyses (IDA) (Vamvatsikos and Cornell, 2002), utilizing  
90 appropriate Engineering Demand Parameters (*EDPs*) to monitor the structure's seismic  
91 performance at increasing levels of *IM*. On the above basis, analytical seismic fragility  
92 curves were computed, thus forming a key tool for evaluating the structural and  
93 operational integrity of each of the structures of interest as well as for undertaking a  
94 probabilistic seismic risk assessment of an oil refinery plant.



95

96 **Fig. 1.** Schematic illustration of a (a) typical process tower, (b) typical steel chimney,  
97 (c) typical RC chimney, (d) typical flare supported by a lattice tower.

## 98 2. CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION AND MODELING APPROACH

### 99 2.1 *Steel process tower*


100 Process towers are considered core oil refinery assets, where various physical and  
101 chemical processes take place, e.g., atmospheric distillation, vacuum distillation,  
102 polymerization, alkylation and isomerization. (Ancheyta 2011). They are essentially  
103 fixed-based freestanding twin-shelled steel structures that form vertical cantilevers,  
104 operating under variable pressure and temperature conditions. A schematic illustration  
105 of a typical process tower is presented in Fig. 1(a), offering an overview of the  
106 structure's typical geometry and main characteristics.

107 The process tower considered in this study is part of an alkylation unit, where light  
108 olefins are combined with isobutane to form high-octane gasoline. The tower is an acid  
109 settler, where the hydrocarbons are separated from the free hydrofluoric acid in two  
110 parts, operating at different pressure levels but at the same high temperature. For  
111 simplicity, the mean value of the operating pressure across the entire height of the  
112 structure was considered equal to 0.94MPa to perform the pertinent capacity checks.  
113 Past research (Karamanos 1996; Diamanti et al. 2011; Papadaki et al. 2018) suggests  
114 that the effect of typical operating pressure on the elastic stiffness of pressure vessels  
115 is negligible and was thus disregarded in the structural model developed for estimating  
116 the seismic response of the process tower. The tower is 30m high, having an internal  
117 diameter equal to 2.6 m. The shell thickness of the tower was defined on the basis of  
118 the internal pressure and not its buckling strength. The thickness varies with elevation,  
119 resulting in four segments with section thicknesses equal to 16mm (elevations: 0.00 –  
120 14.85m), 18mm (elevations: 14.85 – 23.65m), 19mm (elevations: 23.65 – 26.83m) and  
121 18mm (elevations: 26.83 – 32.73m) from base to top. It should be noted that only the  
122 structure's self-weight was accounted for, while the weight of its content was neglected

123 since it is in a vapor state. The total mass of the tower amounts to 49,000kg and it is  
124 distributed along its elevation according to its geometrical properties. The base  
125 anchorage and the skirt support are assumed to be rugged and not prone to earthquake-  
126 induced damage, on account that the base connection components are typically over-  
127 designed (see for instance Moharrami and Amini 2014). Thus, uplift, overturning,  
128 sliding or excessive deformations of the skirt flange were not considered as possible  
129 failure modes in the present study, yet elaborate techniques are available in the literature  
130 to account for them (e.g., Cook et al. 2001) if necessary. The reduced-order numerical  
131 model that was developed for the process tower (see Fig. 2) consists of several  
132 concentrated masses connected through elastic Euler-Bernoulli beam-column elements.  
133 The masses are assigned at different elevations to depict the different courses and the  
134 changes in the shell thickness. To undertake all the necessary structural integrity checks  
135 at critical locations, such as nozzles and manholes, additional nodes were defined in the  
136 model to serve as monitoring points. The stiffness of the beam-column elements was  
137 computed based on the diameter and the exterior wall thickness of the tower.  
138 Geometrical nonlinearities were also taken into account. The utilized elastic beam-  
139 column elements are readily available in the element library of the OpenSees software  
140 platform (McKenna and Fenves 2001) that was employed for computing the tower  
141 earthquake induced demands.

142 P- $\Delta$  effects were taken into account, while elastic material properties were  
143 considered throughout the structure, as there is no ductility in its response. The tower  
144 under investigation is constructed from S275 steel grade; an expected mean yield stress  
145 of 380MPa was adopted according to Braconi et al. (2013). The modal analysis of the  
146 process tower revealed a period of vibration equal to 0.49s for its first two modes  
147 (translational in each of the two principal directions) and a third translational mode with

148 a period equal to 0.08s. The Rayleigh damping model was employed, assigning a 2%  
 149 damping ratio to the 0.49s and 0.08s periods of vibration.



150

151 **Fig. 2.** Generic representation of the lumped mass analytical models that were used  
 152 for the assessment of the process tower and the chimneys. The stack is discretized in  
 153  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$  masses  $m_i$  connected with elements of stiffness  $k_i$ .

154 **2.2 Steel chimneys**

155 Steel chimneys are tall hollow column structures that are mainly susceptible to  
 156 damage due to wind hazard. Even though chimneys may be regarded as non-critical  
 157 structures in an oil refinery, contrary to e.g. the process towers and liquid storage tanks,  
 158 a potential earthquake-induced failure would result in the disruption of operation across  
 159 the entire facility. A schematic illustration of a typical steel chimney is depicted in Fig.  
 160 1(b) to showcase the generic characteristics and the geometry of such structures.

161 A relatively short chimney, 30m high, and a taller one, 80m high, were examined.  
 162 The 30m chimney has an external diameter of 2.2m with its shell thickness being equal  
 163 to 14mm (elevations: 0.00 – 4.16m) close to its base and 10mm (elevations: 4.16 –  
 164 31.20m) at higher elevations. The 80m chimney has six main segments that vary in  
 165 terms of their external diameter and shell thickness. From bottom to top, the diameter  
 166 and thickness of each segment is: 2.5m and 20mm (elevations: 0.00 – 20.00m), 2.5m

167 and 15mm (elevations: 20.00 – 29.00m), 2.35m and 15mm (elevations: 29.00 –  
168 32.00m), 2.2m and 15mm (elevations: 32.00 – 34.00m), 2.2m and 12mm (elevations:  
169 34.00 – 41.80m), 2.2m and 10mm (elevations: 41.80 – 60.00m), and 2.2m and 8mm  
170 (elevations: 60.00 – 79.70m).

171 In both cases, using the model shown in Fig. 2, the masses applied in each one of  
172 the defined nodes represent the self-weight of each segment, proportional to its height,  
173 diameter, and thickness, accounting also for any attached platforms, ladders, and  
174 external coverings. The total mass for the 30m and 80m chimneys are 28,600kg and  
175 101,700kg, respectively. The flue opening located at the base of the chimneys for gas  
176 import is typically considered a weak link from a structural point of view and several  
177 past studies were devoted to the evaluation of the chimney's stiffness and strength at  
178 this particular location (e.g. Huang *et al.* 2004; Gould and Huang 2006). Given the  
179 attention paid to this part, in all examined cases the opening is considered to be well-  
180 designed and sufficiently strengthened, so as not to affect the chimney's lateral  
181 stiffness; hence its potentially adverse effect on the structural integrity was disregarded.  
182 The 30m high chimney is made of S275R steel, which has a mean yield stress equal to  
183 397.56MPa per Braconi et al. (2013) for steel plate thicknesses in the range of 7mm to  
184 16mm. The 80m high chimney is made of S355R steel grade with a mean yield stress  
185 of 487.13MPa (Braconi et al. 2013). In a similar manner to the assumptions made for  
186 the process tower, uplift, overturning and sliding effects regarding the base anchorage  
187 were also neglected for chimneys. For each chimney, a simplified model as per Fig. 2  
188 was developed in the OpenSees analysis platform, using elastic beam-column elements  
189 and accounting for P- $\Delta$  effects. An initial investigation of the model was undertaken by  
190 means of modal analysis to identify the dynamic characteristics of the structures. The  
191 analysis resulted in a fundamental translational period of 0.52s for the 30m high



192 chimney and 2.61s for the 80m high chimney in both their principal loading directions.  
193 The damping ratio for both chimneys was set equal to 2% in their first and third  
194 translational modes of vibration, with the third modes having a period of 0.09s and  
195 0.57s, respectively, for each chimney.

### 196 ***2.3 Reinforced concrete chimney***

197 Concrete is often selected as a construction material for tall industrial chimneys. A  
198 schematic illustration of a typical reinforced concrete (RC) chimney that can be found  
199 in an oil refinery appears in Fig. 1(c). An 87m tall RC chimney is examined, having an  
200 external diameter equal to 4.55m and a shell thickness of 0.3m along its height. The  
201 total mass of the chimney is equal to 2,371,000kg. The distribution of the steel  
202 reinforcement across the structural height resulted in the RC chimney being partitioned  
203 into nine segments, having a longitudinal rebar reinforcement of 94Ø28 at the lower  
204 and 94Ø12 at the top segment. As expected, the steel reinforcement is lower at higher  
205 chimney levels, due to the reduction of the expected internal forces, i.e. the axial and  
206 shear forces as well as bending moments. The chimney is made of C30/37 concrete and  
207 the rebar reinforcements are of B500C steel grade. The nominal material properties are  
208 modified per EN1992-1:2004 (CEN 2004) to obtain the expected values, resulting to  
209 an expected concrete mean yield stress equal to  $f_{c,m} = 38\text{MPa}$  and steel mean yield  
210 stress of  $f_{s,m} = 575\text{MPa}$ . The flue opening at the base of the chimney is assumed to  
211 be stiffened and properly detailed, so as not to affect the lateral stiffness of the chimney  
212 at this particular segment, while the base anchorage is considered to be rugged, leading  
213 to the neglect of uplift, overturning, and sliding failure mechanisms.

214 The reduced-order model of the RC chimney was developed following the generic  
215 stick model scheme presented in Fig. 2. Contrary to the previously presented structural  
216 assets (i.e. steel process tower and steel chimneys), the elements connecting the

217 concentrated masses were defined as nonlinear force-based beam-column fiber section  
218 elements, available in the OpenSees element library (McKenna and Fenves 2001). P- $\Delta$   
219 effects were also considered. In order to capture material nonlinearity, the Mander *et*  
220 *al.* (1988) stress-strain model was employed, explicitly accounting for the stress-strain  
221 behavior of the confined (core) and unconfined (cover) concrete. Cross-section analysis  
222 was performed for the concrete sections at the location of the model nodes to assess  
223 their moment-curvature capacity. Following a modal analysis, the fundamental period  
224 of the RC chimney in both its principal directions was found equal to 1.38s. Since fiber  
225 elements were used in the modeling of the chimney, a damping ratio of 1% was  
226 assigned to the first and the third overall modes of vibration (Sousa *et al.* 2020), i.e.,  
227 the first and second translational modes (1.38s and 0.22s) along any of the two principal  
228 axes.

#### 229 ***2.4 Steel flare***


230 A flare system is an arrangement of piping and specialized equipment that collects  
231 hydrocarbon releases from relief valves, blowdown valves, pressure control valves, and  
232 manual vents and safely disposes them through combustion at the top of a stack (API  
233 2017) that is called flare stack. The latter can be self-supported, mast-guided, or  
234 supported by a lattice tower. Typically, there are a few self-supported flare stacks of  
235 relatively short height located within refining units. Contrarily, the main refinery flare  
236 is typically located outside the core of the facility for safety reasons and, by virtue of  
237 being the tallest, it is often supported by a high-rise lattice tower [see Fig. 1(d)].

238 A flare tower with a total height of approximately 67.4m was examined. The  
239 structure was divided into 12 segments. All structural elements in each segment are  
240 made of European steel circular hollow sections (CHS). The lateral stiffness of the  
241 tower is controlled by diagonal (truss) members, while the horizontal members form a

242 diaphragm at several elevations. The structure's self-weight was assumed to be  
243 concentrated at the four corner joints of each level. The total mass of the tower is equal  
244 to 41,700kg. The base anchorage is assumed to be well designed and earthquake-  
245 resistant, similar to the previously presented case studies.

246 A reduced-order numerical model of the flare was developed in OpenSees as  
247 illustrated in Fig. 3. The structural members of the lattice tower were modeled with  
248 force-based nonlinear beam-column elements and fiber sections. The vertical piping  
249 was modeled with elastic beam-column elements and was connected to the supporting  
250 lattice tower through the horizontal members that form the diaphragms. P- $\Delta$  effects  
251 were taken into account. The adopted detailed modeling technique follows the one  
252 presented by Billionis and Vamvatsikos (2019) for steel lattice towers. In particular, the  
253 stress-strain behavior of the steel fibers was calibrated per each structural member to  
254 reproduce their tensile and buckling strength, resulting in curves similar to the one  
255 illustrated in Fig. 4. The legs (columns) of the tower were made of S355J2K2 steel  
256 grade, which has a mean yield stress  $f_y$  equal to 454.90MPa. The rest of the members  
257 were made of S235J0JR steel grade having a mean yield stress of 328.80MPa. The steel  
258 Young's modulus  $E$  was considered equal to 210GPa. To take into account the reduced  
259 compression resistance due to the potential flexural buckling of the steel members, the  
260 corresponding reduction factor  $\chi$  was calculated for each circular hollow steel member,  
261 according to the procedure prescribed in EN 1993-1-1 (CEN 2005). An example of a  
262 stress-strain curve for an indicative section with  $\chi = 0.76$  is offered in Fig. 4. This  
263 procedure explicitly accounts for the member slenderness as well as for the cross-  
264 section imperfections by means of an imperfection factor that is dependent to the cross-  
265 section shape, the fabrication process, and the material type. The fundamental  
266 eigenperiod of the flare was found equal to 0.35s in both principal axes. The next


267 translational mode (fourth overall) register at 0.14s. A damping ratio equal to 2% was  
 268 assigned to its first and fourth overall (or first and second translational for a given axis)  
 269 modes of vibration (Taillon *et al.* 2012).



270

271

**Fig. 3.** Flare 3D analysis model in OpenSees.




272

273 **Fig. 4.** Steel material stress-strain curve for an indicative flare steel cross-section  
 274 whose buckling strength is  $\chi = 76\%$  times its tensile strength.

275 A first-mode load pattern was utilized to perform static pushover analysis. The  
 276 resulting capacity curve is presented in Fig. 5(a), where the base shear  $V_b$  is normalized

277 by the tower's total weight  $W$  and plotted against the top drift ratio ( $TDR$ ). Inspecting  
 278 the pushover curve suggests that the behavior is mainly elastic with the structure  
 279 achieving a high strength prior to its yielding point [ $V_b/W = 3.12$ ,  $TDR = 0.47\%$ ,  
 280 Fig. 5(b)]. Beyond this point, a small increase in terms of top drift leads to failure of  
 281 the structure in a non-ductile manner [ $V_b/W = 3.24$ ,  $TDR = 0.51\%$ , Fig. 5(c)].  
 282 Therefore, although the strength of the structure is considered to be high, its ductility is  
 283 limited. Overall, the damage progression depicted by the first-mode pushover curve  
 284 indicates that the tower's elastic response is followed by a limited plastic region due to  
 285 the flexural buckling of its diagonal members. Shortly after, this state is followed by  
 286 the structure's global collapse due to the buckling of its leg members.



287

288 **Fig. 5.** Flare: (a) Static Pushover analysis curve; illustration of damage progression,  
 289 featuring (b) yielding and (c) member buckling

### 290 3. METHODOLOGY

#### 291 3.1 Fragility analysis

292 A reliable, yet resource-efficient, estimation of the seismic fragility is essential for  
 293 the seismic risk evaluation of the individual structures and consequently the entire  
 294 facility. The process of deriving analytical fragility curves is well-documented in the  
 295 international literature (e.g. Dymiotis *et al.* 1999; Kwon and Elnashai 2006; Kazantzi

296 *et al.* 2011; Baker 2015; Bakalis and Vamvatsikos 2018; Silva *et al.* 2014, 2019;  
297 Chatzidaki and Vamvatsikos 2021). Seismic fragility is a function of the *IM* and can be  
298 expressed as:

$$299 F_{LS}(IM) = P[LS \text{ violated}|IM] = P[D > C_{LS}|IM] \quad (1)$$

300 where  $F(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function of its arguments with subscript *LS*  
301 denoting the limit-state of interest; *D* is the demand, expressed in *EDP* terms;  $C_{LS}$  is the  
302 capacity threshold paired to the specific *LS* and expressed in *EDP* terms.

303 Under the typical lognormality assumption (Cornell *et al.* 2002), fragility may be  
304 expressed as:

$$305 P[D > C_{LS}|IM] = \Phi\left(\frac{\ln IM - \ln IM^{LS}}{\beta_{LS}}\right) \quad (2)$$

306 where  $IM^{LS}$  is the median value of the *IM* required to violate the *LS* of interest;  $\beta_{LS}$  is  
307 the associated lognormal dispersion in the *IM*, i.e., the standard deviation of the  
308 natural logarithm of the data.

### 309 **3.2 Intensity measures and record selection**

310 The scalar *IM*s adopted are (a) the average spectral acceleration ( $AvgS_a$ , e.g.  
311 Cordova *et al.* 2000; Vamvatsikos and Cornell 2005; Tsantaki and Adam 2013; Eads *et*  
312 *al.* 2015; Kazantzi and Vamvatsikos 2015), being essentially a (moderately) asset-  
313 aware *IM*, and (b) the peak ground acceleration (*PGA*), which is deemed to be an asset-  
314 agnostic *IM*, as it incorporates no information about the structures investigated. The  
315 *PGA* values were computed as the geometric mean of the *PGAs* in the two horizontal  
316 orthogonal directions for each one of the considered ground motion records. The  $AvgS_a$   
317 values were estimated by taking the geometric mean of spectral ordinates in both  
318 principal horizontal directions across a range of equally spaced periods spanning  
319 between 0.1s to 1.0s, with an increment of 0.1s. This range of periods was selected to

320 be (approximately) representative of all the structures that are likely to be encountered  
321 in an oil refinery plant and not necessarily the most representative for the modal periods  
322 of the structures considered in this study. This was a conscious choice, given that the  
323 ultimate scope is to develop and showcase a fragility assessment framework that could  
324 be readily integrated into an overall oil refinery risk assessment, and hence the range of  
325 structural periods should be representative for a large number of structural classes and  
326 not limited to those considered herein.

327 The *IM*s selection is driven by the need to perform risk analysis for multiple  
328 structures without introducing unnecessary complexity. In general, one should strive to  
329 use the optimal *IM* that best fits each structure, for example emphasizing long periods  
330 for a tall stack or short periods for a stiffer pressure vessel. Still, this would enforce the  
331 use of event-based probabilistic seismic hazard assessment, also requiring proper  
332 correlation relationships among the Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPEs)  
333 used for each *IM*. In other words, the more *IM*s one introduces, the more cumbersome  
334 the overall analysis becomes. On the other end, by adopting a single *IM* that is "good  
335 enough" for all structures, one can even use classical Probabilistic Seismic Hazard  
336 Analysis (PSHA) results (i.e., a hazard curve) to do the same analysis with much less  
337 effort. For this reason, this is a common choice even in urban seismic risk studies  
338 (Kohrangi et al. 2016, 2021; Silva *et al.* 2019). Thus, *PGA* and *AvgSa* were chosen as  
339 two useful example cases, since they incorporate accessible *IM* cases easily used in risk  
340 analysis studies.

341 A set of 30 "ordinary" (i.e. non-pulse like, non-long duration) natural ground motion  
342 records was selected from the NGA-West2 database (Ancheta et al. 2013) for  
343 evaluating the induced seismic demands in the structures of interest via IDA,  
344 considering the horizontal components of the excitation in both orthogonal directions.

345 The record selection process is documented by Bakalis *et al.* (2018), where the  
346 interested reader could find more details on how the hazard-consistent ground motions  
347 were selected using the conditional spectrum record selection technique proposed by  
348 Kohrangi *et al.* (2017). The record sequence numbers (RSN) of the selected ground  
349 motions are provided as follows: 33, 163, 231, 316, 371, 411, 728, 745, 802, 825, 855,  
350 880, 1077, 1177, 1202, 1234, 1259, 1268, 1277, 1503, 1507, 1549, 1596, 1617, 1787,  
351 2654, 2703, 2893, 3222, 3512. It should be noted that the investigated structures were  
352 assumed to be located within an oil refinery, extending over an area that is regarded as  
353 small enough to neglect any differentiation of ground motion characteristics within the  
354 facility boundaries. Therefore, the same ground motion records are applied to all  
355 structures, assuming full spatial event-to-event correlation, while record-to-record  
356 variability stands as the primary source of uncertainty.

#### 357 **4. DEMAND AND CAPACITY ASSESSMENT**

##### 358 ***4.1 Steel process tower***

359 The definition of appropriate DSs is required to capture the main failure modes of a  
360 structure and consequently quantify its damage in the aftermath of seismic events with  
361 various intensities. Two distinct mutually exclusive DSs (i.e. DS1 and DS2) were  
362 defined for the process tower and paired to damage levels that are likely to undermine  
363 its operational and structural integrity.

364 The transition to the less severe DS1 is signified upon the exceedance of the 0.5%  
365 *TDR* threshold, which essentially corresponds to the damage limitation threshold of the  
366 EN1998-6:2005 (CEN 2005) provisions. Higher top displacements are deemed to result  
367 in the disruption of the tower operation by damaging the attached piping. One may  
368 introduce further damage states for piping at higher levels of interstory drift or, e.g.,  
369 excessive rotation at the pipe attachment (Corritore et al. 2021). Still, pertinent data is



370 lacking in general and largely depends on the pipe and on the pipe-vessel connection  
 371 characteristics. Therefore, we focused only on the onset of damage. On the other hand,  
 372 DS2 is associated with the structural integrity of the tower, and the transition to this DS  
 373 was checked against a shell buckling verification criterion adopted by EN1993-1-  
 374 6:2007 (CEN 2007). To assess the local stability of the shell, the required axial and  
 375 shear forces, as well as the bending moments were obtained along the tower elevation  
 376 at each analysis step of the response history analyses. The tower was treated as a stepped  
 377 cylinder according to EN1993-1-6:2007. Different segments of the tower with equal  
 378 wall thickness were uniformly treated, essentially resulting in a three-segment stepped  
 379 cylinder as per Annex D of EN1993-1-6:2007. The buckling strength verification is  
 380 performed through the variable  $R_c$  defined as:

$$381 \quad R_c = \left( \frac{\sigma_E}{\sigma_R} \right)^{k_x} + \left( \frac{\tau_E}{\tau_R} \right)^{k_\tau}, \quad (3)$$


382 where  $\sigma_E$  is the axial buckling stress;  $\sigma_R$  is the axial buckling resistance;  $\tau_E$  is the shear  
 383 buckling stress;  $\tau_R$  in the shear buckling resistance; and  $k_x, k_\tau$  are the combination  
 384 factors for the interaction of axial compression and shear. The peak value of  $R_c$  is  
 385 computed at each time step to account for the interaction of meridional (axial)  
 386 compression with the coexistent shear and internal pressure. The DS description and  
 387 the corresponding capacity thresholds are summarized in Table 1. When  $R_c$  exceeds  
 388 unity, failure is encountered, or strictly speaking, transition to DS2 is observed, deemed  
 389 to be representative of structural integrity loss.

390 **Table 1.** Process Tower: DS classification and capacity thresholds.

Damage States	Description	Capacity Checks
DS1	Top drift of the tower causing disruption of the operation or damage to the connected piping	$TDR \geq 0.5\%$
DS2	Local buckling of the shell causing severe structural damage	$R_c \geq 1.0$

391

392 The 16/50/84% fractile IDA curves for the process tower are presented in Fig. 6,  
 393 where the *EDPs* related to the DSs are plotted against the two considered *IMs*. As stated  
 394 earlier, the *EDP* estimates are derived from an elastic model (in terms of the material  
 395 properties), therefore the response is linear for DS1 [see Fig. 6(a-b)]. By virtue of  $R_c$   
 396 being a nonlinear combination of the model outputs, the IDA curves shown in Fig. 6(c-  
 397 d) are actually nonlinear, yet this nonlinearity is not that apparent for the presented  
 398 range of intensities.



399

400 **Fig. 6.** Process tower IDA curves and 16/50/84% fractiles: (a) *TDR* versus *PGA*, (b)  
 401 *TDR* versus *AvgS<sub>a</sub>*, (c)  $R_c$  versus *PGA*, (d)  $R_c$  versus *AvgS<sub>a</sub>*.

#### 402 4.2 Steel chimneys

403 Three distinct DSs were considered for the performance assessment of the steel  
 404 chimneys. DS1 is related to their operability and the corresponding 0.5% limit for the  
 405 *TDR* of the chimneys is adopted after EN1998-6:2005. DS2 is associated with liner  
 406 damage and transition to this state was considered to occur at an Intersegment Drift


407 Ratio ( $IDR$ , namely the drift angle between two consecutive levels of the chimney) of  
 408 1.2% after the EN1998-6:2005 provisions. Finally, the transition to DS3 signals the  
 409 structural failure of the chimney due to the local buckling of its outer shell. The latter  
 410 was checked following the same procedure outlined in Section 4.1 for the process tower  
 411 according to EN1993-1-6:2007. A stepped cylinder approach was employed and the  
 412 sequential segments with the same wall thickness were treated as one. The checks were  
 413 performed considering the peak parameter  $R_c$  [after Eq. (3)] as the  $EDP$ . The  
 414 description of the steel chimney DSs and their pertinent capacity thresholds are listed  
 415 in Table 2.

416 **Table 2.** Steel Chimneys: DS classification and capacity thresholds.

Damage States	Description	Capacity Checks
DS1	Top drift of the chimney causing damage to the connected piping	$TDR \geq 0.5\%$
DS2	Intersegment drift causing damage to the liner	$IDR \geq 1.2\%$
DS3	Local buckling of the shell causing severe structural damage	$R_c \geq 1.0$


417

418 The IDA results are presented in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 for the 30m and 80m high steel  
 419 chimneys, respectively. As Fig. 7(a-d) attest, the linear model displays a response of  
 420 high variability that could be partially attributed to the higher mode effects. The IDA  
 421 curves presented in Fig. 7(e-f) deviate from linearity, an effect of the  $R_c$  criterion being  
 422 a nonlinear function of the otherwise linear model. The same observations hold for the  
 423 IDA curves of the 80m high steel chimney that appear in Fig. 8.



424

425 **Fig. 7.** 30m steel chimney IDA curves and 16/50/84% fractiles: (a)  $TDR$  versus  $PGA$ ,  
 426 (b)  $TDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (c)  $IDR$  versus  $PGA$ , (d)  $IDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (e)  $R_c$  versus  
 427  $PGA$ , (f)  $R_c$  versus  $AvgS_a$ .



428

429 **Fig. 8.** 80m steel chimney IDA curves and 16/50/84% fractiles: (a)  $TDR$  versus  $PGA$ ,  
 430 (b)  $TDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (c)  $IDR$  versus  $PGA$ , (d)  $IDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (e)  $R_c$  versus  
 431  $PGA$ , (f)  $R_c$  versus  $AvgS_a$ .

432 **4.3 Reinforced concrete chimney**

433 Three DSs were considered for the RC chimney. DS1 is attained at a  $TDR$  equal to  
 434 0.5% similarly to the steel chimneys. DS2 was associated with two failure modes, one  
 435 related to liner damage that was assumed to occur at  $IDR$  demand exceeding 1.2% and  
 436 a second one related to the transition of the cross-sections to their yielding state that  
 437 could be paired with low to moderate structural damages (e.g. visible cracking). For the

438 latter failure mode, the check was performed along the chimney elevation by checking  
 439 at each analysis time-step whether the seismic demand, expressed in terms of the  
 440 section bending moment ( $M_E$ ), exceeds the yield moment ( $M_y$ ) capacity of the pertinent  
 441 cross-section. The transition to DS2 is signaled by either of those checks being violated.  
 442 It should be noted that DS2 is paired with low to moderate structural damage that would  
 443 however require the shutdown of the chimney and the execution of extensive repair  
 444 works. The scalar parameter  $R_2$ , defined as the maximum of two demand-to-capacity  
 445 ratios to account for both of the aforementioned damage states, was the *EDP* considered  
 446 for DS2:

$$447 \quad R_2 = \max \left\{ \frac{M_E}{M_y} ; \frac{IDR(\%)}{1.2\%} \right\} \quad (4)$$

448 where,  $M_E$  is the seismic demand in terms of bending moment; *IDR* is the intersegment  
 449 drift (in %);  $M_y$  is the yield moment.


450 DS3 is related to severe structural damage of the RC shell (global failure of the  
 451 structure). The attainment of DS3 is signified when the bending moment at the cross-  
 452 section ( $M_E$ ) exceeds its ultimate bending moment capacity ( $M_u$ ). The  $R_3$  demand-to-  
 453 capacity ratio was employed as the *EDP* for DS3:

$$454 \quad R_3 = \frac{M_E}{M_u} \quad (5)$$

455 The description of the DSs along with their thresholds are listed in Table 3. Fig. 9  
 456 presents the IDA curves obtained for the reinforced concrete chimney. The waving IDA  
 457 curves illustrated reveal the notable nonlinear response of the RC chimney.

458 **Table 3.** RC Chimney: DS classification and capacity.

Limit States	Description	Capacity Checks
DS1	Top drift of the chimney causing damage to the connected piping	$TDR \geq 0.5\%$
DS2	Intersegment drift causing damage to the liner OR cross-section yielding causing low-to-moderate structural damage (e.g. cracking)	$R_2 \geq 1.0$



460

461 **Fig. 9.** RC Chimney IDA curves and 16/50/84 fractiles: (a)  $TDR$  versus  $PGA$ , (b)  
 462  $TDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (c)  $R_2$  versus  $PGA$ , (d)  $R_2$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (e)  $R_3$  versus  $PGA$ , (f)  
 463  $R_3$  versus  $AvgS_a$ .

#### 464 4.4 Steel flare

465 Three DSs were defined for the flare. In particular, DS1 is related to operational  
 466 disturbances, where the 0.5% limit for  $TDR$  after EN1998-6:2005 was adopted as a  
 467 threshold to prevent damage to the attached mechanical equipment. DS2 is associated

468 with nonstructural damage in the vertical piping. Thus, the intersegment drift that might  
 469 cause damage to the vertical piping is checked against the 1.2% limit of EN1998-  
 470 6:2005. Transition to DS3, deemed to be the global collapse damage state, is signaled  
 471 by the failure of a member of the tower either in tension or compression (member global  
 472 buckling). Based on the pushover findings (Fig. 5), the failure of a single member is  
 473 considered herein to lead to the global instability for the entire tower. Therefore, the  
 474 integrity of all structural member was checked, and in particular of the legs and diagonal  
 475 members that are the main load bearing elements. To this end, the parameter  $R_M$  was  
 476 introduced as the maximum demand-to-capacity ratio of tensile or axial failure over all  
 477 legs and diagonals to identify the most critical failure mode:

$$478 \quad R_M = \max_{\text{all } i} \left\{ \max \left( \frac{N_{E,t}^i}{N_{y,t}^i}; \frac{N_{E,c}^i}{N_{y,c}^i} \right) \right\} \quad (6)$$


479 where for each member (leg or diagonal)  $i$ :  $N_{E,t}^i$  is the tensile axial force demand;  $N_{y,t}^i$   
 480 is the tensile axial resistance;  $N_{E,c}^i$  is the compressive axial force demand;  $N_{y,c}^i$  is the  
 481 buckling resistance. It should be noted that some bending moment develops in the tower  
 482 legs; however, this parasitic moment was found to be very low for such a triangulated  
 483 lattice tower and was thus neglected. Consequently, the integrity of the members was  
 484 checked solely on the basis of the developed axial forces. The description of the DSs  
 485 and the corresponding capacity thresholds are tabulated in Table 4.

486 **Table 4.** Flare: DS classification and capacity thresholds.

Damage States	Description	Capacity checks
DS1	Top drift of the tower causing damage to mechanical equipment	$TDR \geq 0.5\%$
DS2	Intersegment drift causing damage to the vertical piping	$IDR \geq 1.2\%$
DS3	Member tensile or buckling failure causing global collapse	$R_M \geq 1.0$

487





488

489 **Fig. 10.** Flare IDA curves and 16/50/84% fractiles: (a)  $TDR$  versus  $PGA$ , (b)  $TDR$   
 490 versus  $AvgS_a$ , (c)  $IDR$  versus  $PGA$ , (d)  $IDR$  versus  $AvgS_a$ , (e)  $R_M$  versus  $PGA$ , (f)  
 491  $R_M$  versus  $AvgS_a$ .

492 The IDA curves for the flare are presented in Fig. 10 for both  $IMs$  and the three  
 493  $EDPs$  considered for each one of the defined  $DSs$ . As can be inferred, especially by  
 494 inspecting the strength-limited  $R_M$  results, the structural behavior is elastic up to a  
 495 critical point, beyond which failure occurs without allowing any significant ductility to  
 496 develop in the model.

497 **5. FRAGILITY CURVES**

498 Fragility curves were generated for each DS, employing a lognormal distribution  
499 fitting on the empirical data points. Median and dispersion estimates are tabulated in  
500 Table 5 for each one of the structures examined. To account for the capacity-related  
501 uncertainties in the fragility definition, 100 normally distributed capacity realizations  
502 were generated for each ground motion record, assuming a 20% covariance (COV)  
503 around the median DS threshold capacities without any correlation among different  
504 failure modes defining a given DS. Fig. 11 presents the empirical cumulative  
505 distribution function (CDF) data points along with the associated lognormal fits.

506 The results for the process tower, shown in Fig. 11(a-b), indicate that (a) the  
507 lognormal distribution is a good approximation of the process tower seismic fragility;  
508 (b) there would not be a high probability of damage for the process tower for low to  
509 moderate intensity earthquakes; and (c) for seismic events of higher intensity, the  
510 probability for the structure to lose its operational capacity is high, while that of losing  
511 its structural integrity is lower but still nonnegligible. Another notable observation is  
512 that the dispersion of the seismic fragility at both DSs is lower when  $AvgS_a$  is  
513 considered. This means that the average spectral acceleration, as defined in this study,  
514 is a more efficient *IM* than the *PGA* across the entire structural response of interest, and  
515 hence one needs to invest less computational effort for delivering robust response  
516 estimates by means of response history analyses if such an *IM* is adopted (Kazantzi and  
517 Vamvatsikos, 2015).

518 With regards to the steel chimneys, as can be inferred by inspecting Fig. 11(c-d) for  
519 the 30m chimney and Fig. 11(e-f) for the 80m chimney, regardless of the chimney  
520 height, the DSs are sequential, while the tallest chimney is in general more susceptible  
521 to both non-structural and structural damages compared to the shorter 30m high

522 chimney. With reference to the 80m high chimney, DS1 and DS2 fragility curves are  
523 very close to each other [see Fig. 11(e-f)]. This condition essentially implies that its  
524 operational integrity is likely to be undermined by either excessive top displacements  
525 or damage imposed to its liner. A comparison between the two steel chimneys reveals  
526 that the 80m high chimney is more susceptible to reaching the DS1 and DS2 compared  
527 to the 30m high chimney, and also slightly more prone to local buckling (i.e. DS3, in  
528 terms of the fragility curves with *PGA* as an IM). The two chimneys having comparable  
529 fragility to local buckling may be attributed to the higher steel grade used for the taller  
530 one, as well as to the contribution of the higher eigenmodes in the response. Moreover,  
531 the 80m high steel chimney is in fact a very flexible structure, a condition that actually  
532 results in the reduction of shear forces and moments during the seismic response.

533 The fragility curves for the RC chimney [Fig. 11(g-h)] reveal that the chimney has  
534 a low probability of reaching DS3 and consequently being severely damaged, but is  
535 much more susceptible to nonstructural damages or other minor damages (associated  
536 with the attainment of DS1 and DS2). This could undermine its operational capacity  
537 and result in severe downtime for repairs something that should certainly be accounted  
538 for in a broader risk assessment process.


539 For the flare asset, a notable observation with reference the computed fragility  
540 curves [Fig. 11(i-j)] is that DS3, which signals the violation of the structural integrity  
541 of the lattice tower, is the most critical DS, with the highest probability of exceedance  
542 among the other DSs, across the entire range of intensity levels. This observation could  
543 be explained on account of the pushover findings (see Fig. 8), illustrating that the drift  
544 limits specified in the code (and adopted herein as the DS1/2 thresholds, see Table 4)  
545 cannot be easily reached by this stiff lattice tower, at least not before a member buckles  
546 first. Nevertheless, the overall seismic performance of the examined flare is deemed to

547 be satisfactory, since substantially high intensity levels are needed to impose the  
 548 seismic demands that could trigger a catastrophic failure. Quite notably also, the *PGA*  
 549 fragility estimates are characterized by slightly lower dispersion values compared to  
 550 those obtained on the basis of *AvgS<sub>a</sub>*. This is a byproduct of the conscious decision to  
 551 evaluate the *AvgS<sub>a</sub>* across a range of periods (0.1 – 1.0s) that are mostly longer than  
 552 the 0.35s fundamental period of the stiff flare.

553 **Table 5.** Median and dispersion of fragility curves (lognormal distribution fitting) for  
 554 each of five structures.

Damage States		DS1		DS2		DS3	
		median (g)	dispersion	median (g)	dispersion	median (g)	dispersion
<b>Process Tower</b>	<i>PGA</i>	0.65	0.54	1.16	0.54	—	—
	<i>AvgS<sub>a</sub></i>	0.91	0.39	1.63	0.39	—	—
<b>30m Steel Chimney</b>	<i>PGA</i>	0.57	0.59	0.93	0.59	1.45	0.56
	<i>AvgS<sub>a</sub></i>	0.80	0.39	1.31	0.39	2.03	0.35
<b>80m Steel Chimney</b>	<i>PGA</i>	0.31	0.88	0.35	0.71	1.34	0.58
	<i>AvgS<sub>a</sub></i>	0.43	0.65	0.50	0.46	1.87	0.29
<b>RC Chimney</b>	<i>PGA</i>	0.37	0.89	0.62	0.69	1.83	1.00
	<i>AvgS<sub>a</sub></i>	0.60	0.55	0.87	0.52	2.43	0.88
<b>Flare</b>	<i>PGA</i>	1.78	0.41	2.22	0.55	1.08	0.34
	<i>AvgS<sub>a</sub></i>	2.49	0.47	3.11	0.56	1.51	0.46

555



556

557 **Fig. 11.** Fragility curves using as IM the  $PGA$  (left) and the  $AvgS_a$  (right) for each of  
 558 five structures.

559 **6. CONCLUSIONS**

560 A comprehensive analytical seismic fragility assessment for high-rise structures  
 561 encountered in oil refineries was presented. Four typical structural typologies were  
 562 examined, namely a process tower, two steel chimneys, a reinforced concrete chimney,

563 and a flare. A set of numerical models was developed, on a minimum needed  
564 complexity basis, to ensure that the dominant failure modes are always captured while  
565 the framework remains efficient for practical applications, by directing the  
566 computational power and skill resources where needed most. To assess the seismic  
567 demands across a range of *IM* levels, IDAs were performed using a set of hazard-  
568 consistent ground motion records. Appropriate damage states were defined to account  
569 for both the serviceability and the structural integrity of the considered assets. High-  
570 quality analytical fragility curves were derived that account for both the epistemic  
571 uncertainties associated with the structural capacity and the randomness stemming from  
572 the ground motion record characteristics. It was demonstrated that the examined  
573 structures can suffer significant structural damage or collapse only at very high levels  
574 of seismic intensity. On the other hand, relatively lower accelerations may disrupt their  
575 operation and consequently affect the functionality of the entire oil refinery. For  
576 instance, failure of the connected piping would require the shut-down of an entire  
577 refinery unit for undertaking the needed repairs. The presented results showcased that  
578 seismic hazard should explicitly be considered when assessing, not only the structural,  
579 but also the operational integrity of individual structures that form an integrated critical  
580 industrial facility. The produced analytical seismic fragility curves along with the  
581 presented methodology can be exploited by researchers, engineers, and stakeholders to  
582 conduct a seismic risk assessment of an entire oil refinery unit.

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851 The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

852 **Data Availability**

853 Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available  
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